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FEDERAL LAW, STATE POLICY, AND
INDIAN GAMING
Kevin K. Washbum*
Indian tribes have been something of an enigma in the federal Constitutional scheme for more than 200 years. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice
John Marshall indicated that federal law and treaties contemplated "Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states."' Although the Supreme
Court now recognizes that "ordinarily" Indian reservations are considered part
of the territory of states,2 conceiving them so can be misleading. Indeed, in the
1973 case of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, the Supreme
Court described Indian reservations as "separate, although dependant nations"
and recognized that, with some exceptions, "state law could have no role to
play within the reservation boundaries." 3 A discussion of Indian gaming is
particularly appropriate for a symposium on cross-border issues because the
Indian gaming industry's very existence can be traced to an important "crossborder" issue: the applicability of state gaming laws on Indian reservations.
When McClanahan was decided, most states prohibited gambling, or at
least restricted gaming activities to very low stakes or charitable events.4
Although McClanahan was a tax case, the sweeping language in the opinion,
and in other opinions handed down during the same era, emboldened tribes,
many of which faced dire economic circumstances. To take advantage of the
federal protection that McClanahan provided to Indian tribes on their own
lands, several tribes initiated gaming operations on Indian lands that, outside of
Indian reservations, would be prohibited by state law. Tribes also decided to
allow non-Indian patrons to participate, a decision that made the enterprises far
more lucrative, yet far more controversial.
State governments opposed tribal efforts to initiate gaming enterprises and
were particularly unhappy that tribes aggressively encouraged state citizens to
patronize the operations. The sweeping language in McClanahan did not faze
the state governments. In light of non-Indian state citizen participation, state
officials believed they had a legitimate interest in the activity and a solid justification on which to assert jurisdiction. Where states saw a controversial crossborder issue and lawyers saw an interesting legal question, Indian tribes saw
opportunity.
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author wishes to express
appreciation to Libby Washburn, Mary LaFrance, Bret Birdsong, Kathryn Rand, Chloe
Thompson, and his gracious editor, Gail Cline.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
2
See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001) (Indian territory is now ordinarily
considered part of a state's territory).
3 McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973).
4 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311 (5th Cir. 1981)
(describing Florida's charitable gaming laws).
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Neither Indian tribes, nor Nevadans for that matter, have any particular
native talent in running gaming operations; rather, they have a unique jurisdictional circumstance. Both Indian tribes and states are sovereigns within a
greater sovereign. They possess sovereign governmental authority over certain
discrete business activities and may choose the substance, method, and scope of
regulation of those activities within their respective jurisdictions. In Indian
authority is described by the legal/political phrase,
country, this governmental
5
"tribal sovereignty."
For Indian tribes, the exercise of tribal sovereignty to operate and regulate
gaming enterprises, while coupled with the fact that, on the other side of the
reservation boundary, state governments exercise their own sovereign powers
to adopt a highly restrictive approach toward gaming, has produced a tremendous opportunity. In exploiting the opportunity created in part by tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes have collectively created a $14.5 billion Indian gaming
industry in the United States. 6
It is important to recognize that this gaming opportunity has arisen not
from tribal sovereignty alone. Many jurisdictions, including foreign countries,
have a greater quantum of "sovereignty" than Indian nations in the United
States. 7 While sovereignty is thus a necessary condition to the tribes' ability to
be successful in the Indian gaming industry, it is not a sufficient condition.
Indeed, although tribal sovereignty allows Indian tribes to authorize and regulate casino gaming (within some limits that are discussed in greater detail
below), it is not tribal sovereignty or even federal law that makes Indian gaming successful. In an ironic twist on historical federal Indian policy, it is state
law that makes Indian gaming successful.
Indian gaming is profitable only because states have created and preserved
state legal regimes that maintain the Indian tribes' monopolistic power in the
gaming market place. Because states have maintained strict restrictions or
prohibitions on commercial gaming outside of Indian country, consumers flock
to Indian casinos, which are, in effect, tribal islands of gaming permissiveness
in state oceans of gaming intolerance. Put another way, by preventing gaming
consumers from being able to find lawful gaming opportunities near their own
neighborhoods, state governments force these consumers to seek out and visit
Indian casinos, sometimes traveling several hours to play.
I States have some quantum of sovereignty too. Perhaps because the extent of state sovereignty in the federal structure is more apparent on the face of the Constitution, state officials
do not, as a practical matter, spend as much time talking about it. Indian tribal sovereignty is
also apparent from the Constitution, though implicit, and it has often been encroached upon
by states and the federal government, leaving Indian tribes far less secure in their sovereignty. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002).
6 Indian tribes have also sometimes exploited "cross-border" differences in regulatory tax
schemes by offering tobacco products and even gasoline at more attractive tax rates than
states offer. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (dealing with gasoline); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980) (dealing with tobacco).
7 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 2 (1831), Chief Justice Marshall famously
asserted that Indian tribes are not foreign nations, but instead are "domestic dependent
nations," a term that was not defined or even mentioned in the Constitution or other federal
law, thus giving Marshall maximum flexibility in crafting the legal status of Indian tribes.
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If states adopt more permissive attitudes toward the gaming industry in
general, and allow citizens and businesses to offer commercial gambling
widely within the state, Indian casinos will no longer constitute islands of permissiveness that draw consumers, but landlocked casinos in inconvenient locations that will have difficulty competing with more advantageously placed
casinos.
This Article will set forth the legal authorization and the economic success
of Indian gaming by asking and answering two rhetorical questions: "What
makes Indian gaming lawful?" and "What makes Indian gaming successful?"
This Article will conclude with the observation that Indian gaming exists
almost entirely at the mercy of state governments. It will argue that, while
Indian gaming began as a cross-border issue, it no longer has those features.
Indeed, it has been transformed into the very antithesis of a cross-border issue,
a political issue that is addressed almost entirely in the sphere of state political
processes. The issue no longer spans borders, but is an internal state political
issue. This Article will then explain the ramifications of this transformation
both for federal Indian law and policy and for those who wish to study the
development and resolution of cross-border problems.
I.

Q: WHAT MAKES INDIAN GAMING LAWFUL? A: STATE LAW

The history of Indian gaming is the history of a cross-border issue: the
unsuccessful, then successful, and now somewhat uncertain attempt by state
governments to extend their gaming laws into Indian reservations. The history
is now familiar.8
Indian gaming began modestly in the 1970s with high stakes bingo operations in California and Florida. Although more limited forms of bingo were
lawful in each of those states, state and local officials raised stronger and louder
objections, as Indian bingo operations grew larger and more successful. Local
officials in California believed that they had a particularly strong basis for challenging the Indian bingo operations because, in 1953, Congress had enacted a
law popularly known as Public Law 280 that recognized state criminal jurisdic8 The history of Indian gaming has been documented far more thoroughly elsewhere. See,

e.g., Eric Henderson, Ancestry and Casino Dollars in the Formation of Tribal Identity, 4
RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 7 (1998); Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences,
29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 205 (1997); Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and
Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711 (1996); Karen S. McFadden, Note,
The Stakes Are Too High to Gamble Away Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficiency, and
Economic Development When Amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L.
807 (1996); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the
Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
381 (1997); Sherry M. Thompson, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of Reservation Gaming in the United States and Canada, 11 ARiz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 521 (1994);
Sidney M. Wolf, Killing the New Buffalo: State Eleventh Amendment Defense to Enforcement of IGRA Indian Gaming Compacts, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 51 (1995);
Kevin J Worthen & Wayne R. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian Gaming?
"A Few Pages of History Are Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU L. REV. 407. Briefly
touching on the history is useful in revealing the extensive power states may exercise over
Indian gaming.
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tion over Indian reservations within California and several other states. 9
Because Public Law 280 had dramatically changed the federal common law of
Indian nations, the sweeping language of McClanahan had far less force in
these states. Thus, from the perspective of state governments, California was a
good place for a test case.
From the state officials' standpoint, Indian gaming was not a "cross-border" issue. Particularly in California, state officials believed that state gaming
laws extended into Indian reservations. When local law enforcement officials
in California repeatedly threatened criminal prosecution, an Indian tribe sought
federal declaratory relief that the threats were invalid. The case reached the
Supreme Court in 1987, resulting in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians.'o
A.

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians

In Cabazon, the Court construed Public Law 280 to recognize that Congress had given California the authority to apply its criminal laws and to exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction on Indian reservations, but had not given
California the authority to exercise regulatory authority on Indian reservations." In other words, while Indian tribes must submit to state criminal
authority and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, civil regulatory power over Indian
activities remained within the exclusive domain of tribal governments.
If the state possessed criminal authority, but the tribe possessed exclusive
regulatory authority, the immediate question was whether high stakes Indian
bingo was an activity subject to criminal authority or regulatory authority. The
State of California argued that the gaming activity was squarely within its grant
of criminal jurisdiction because the activity clearly violated two provisions of
the California Penal Code. 12
To the dismay of California and other states, 13 however, the Court rejected
this argument. It used a broader approach in analyzing the nature of the authority that the state sought to exercise. The Court explained that California's
approach to gambling in general, and bingo in particular, was better characterized as regulatory, rather than prohibitory, thus Indian gaming activities were
within the regulatory domain over which California had not been granted
authority.' 4 As for the criminal provisions in the state penal code cited by
California, the Court explained that even though "an otherwise regulatory law
is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means [that] does not necessarily
5
convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of [Public Law 280]."'
9 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2000), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (2000), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). See Carole E.
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22
UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of
Lawlessness in CaliforniaIndian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997).
10 480 U.S. 202 (1987).

11ld. at 210.
12 Id. at 211.
13 Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Connecticut
signed on as amici curiae on behalf of California for reversal. Id. at 204.
14 Id. at 211-12.
15 Id.at 211.
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For Indian tribes, the Cabazon decision spurred grandiose plans for economic development on Indian reservations across the country. For state and
local governments, the decision caused tremendous frustration. After Cabazon,
California, and any other state with Public Law 280 authority over Indian
tribes, had the theoretical power to prohibit Indian gaming altogether by simply
adopting strict prohibitions on all forms of gaming and making the prohibitions
criminally enforceable. Such action would render gaming a subject of state
criminal-prohibitory law, rather than tribal-regulatory law. Thus, after the
Cabazon decision, Indian gaming was lawful only if the state allowed some
form of gaming. State governments, however, were not willing to end all charitable gaming simply to stop Indian gaming. From the states' standpoint, Indian
gaming became a cross-border problem, largely because of the states' own
political constraints. As a result, Indian reservations that were located entirely
within state borders generally remained unhampered by state gambling laws.
B.

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)

Even before the Supreme Court decided Cabazon, state and local governments had approached Congress about Indian gaming issues and Congress held
hearings regarding those issues." The Cabazon decision provoked additional
activity on Capitol Hill. In response to intense lobbying from numerous interested parties, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in the fall of
1988,17 which, among other matters relevant to this discussion, clarified the
role of states with regard to Indian gaming. In a delicate political environment,
in which Congress had tremendous difficulty pleasing the diverse interests,
Congress purported not to be altering the legal rule set forth in Cabazon,'8 but
merely to be providing "a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes.' ' 9
In IGRA, Congress indicated that Indian tribes may engage in, or license
and regulate, bingo and similar games (called Class II gaming)2" in any state in
which bingo is lawful, for any purpose, by any person, organization, or entity.2 '
Thus, if a state allowed charitable bingo games by churches and fraternal orga16

Activity on Indian gaming in both houses of Congress began in earnest in 1986. See

MORRIS K.

UDALL, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, ESTABLISHING FED-

ERAL STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF GAMING ACTIVITIES ON INDIAN

H.R. REP. No. 99-488 (1986), and
HON. MARK ANDRES, SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, TO ESTABLISH FEDERAL STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF GAMING ACTIVITIES ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND LANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 99-493 (1986).
RESERVATIONS AND LANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,

11 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as

amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000)).
18 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000).
19 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000). This language was perhaps somewhat disingenuous. Tribes

likely did not feel that they needed a "statutory basis" for gaming when they already had a
solid federal common law basis for gaming that was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court. In enacting IGRA, Congress nevertheless planted its own flag in Indian
gaming. Yet, because the issue is fraught with such political peril - one or more important
constituency will be angered by any significant amendment to the law - Congress has since
been unable to seriously re-examine its legislation.
20
21

25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) (2000); 25 C.F.R. § 502.3 (2002).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2000).
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nizations, Indian tribes could conduct bingo without regard to the specific limitations set by the state.2 2 As a result of this federal legal structure, tribal bingo
continues to exist at the sufferance of state governments. For Class II gaming,
Congress thus preserved the Cabazon principle that tribes may engage in this
activity as long as states do not prohibit it.
In enacting IGRA, Congress thus seemingly clarified the cross-border
issue by further elucidating the scope of the state's authority over Indian bingo.
Nevertheless, even bingo has continued to cause substantial "cross-border"
controversy after the enactment of IGRA. The provisions defining bingo and
similar games are extensive, but the most controversial aspect is the inclusion
of alternative forms of bingo, such as "instant bingo" and "pull-tabs." 2 3 These
games, when played in electronic format, resemble slot machines in some
respects. As a result, a state that has thoroughly prohibited all forms of casino
gaming, but has continued to allow charitable bingo, may find so-called "Class
II" slot machines on Indian reservations within the state. A tremendous amount
of litigation has confirmed that this issue continues to exist and bears many of
the hallmarks of a cross-border issue.24 Though states may prohibit Indian
bingo, states continue to see Indian bingo as a "cross-border" issue because the
scope of Class II gaming is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, because even electronic forms of Indian bingo are authorized only in states where bingo gaming
is lawful in some form, states also theoretically have the power to prohibit
Indian bingo.25
State governments may also see a cross-border issue related to enforcement of unlawful gaming by a tribe. Tribal sovereign immunity makes an
Indian tribe immune from any legal action by a state government.2 6 States are
prohibited from bringing an action against a tribe even for flouting an absolute
state prohibition on the conduct of bingo. Without any independent means of
enforcing the legal right to prohibit Class II gaming, a state that wishes to take
action to stop unlawful Class II gaming by a tribe is limited to seeking voluntary compliance from the tribe or asking the United States to take legal action.
So-called "casino style" gaming is another matter entirely. Under IGRA
provisions, states have far greater authority over casino style gaming on Indian
lands, described in IGRA as "Class III gaming."27 In contrast to Class II gaming, where Congress effectively left the cross-border issue intact by giving the
states the right to prohibit Indian bingo only if they prohibited all charitable
See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1990)
(for an early interpretation of these provisions in the related context of Class III
casino-style
gaming).
23 See 27 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) (2000); 25 C.F.R. § 502.3 (2002).
24 See, e.g., Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Indians v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d
1019 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 324 F.3d 607 (8th Cir.
2003); Diamond Gaming Enters., Inc. v. Reno, 230 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
25 Bingo, for example, is strictly prohibited in the State of Utah, and thus even Indian bingo
is unlawful in that state. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1101, 1102 (2001).
26 Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1999).
27 Class III gaming is defined by federal law at 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2000), and more
specifically in federal regulations at 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (2002). The definition includes any
house banking card games, baccarat, blackjack, pai gow, roulette, craps, keno, slot machines,
sports betting, pari-mutuel and lotteries.
22
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bingo, Congress sought to solve all cross-border issues in Class III gaming by
requiring tribes and states to come to an agreement on any such gaming.28
Under IGRA, tribes may conduct Class III gaming only if state law does not
prohibit such gaming and only when the state has entered into a "gaming compact" with the tribe that authorizes and governs the specific gaming activities. 29
The requirement of a tribal-state compact gave states a large role in determining the legality of Indian gaming by making state cooperation a prerequisite
for lawful Class III Indian gaming. Thus, IGRA was a clear attempt to resolve
cross-border problems in gaming by forcing the interested jurisdictions to negotiate with one another.
But, while Congress required states to negotiate Class III gaming compacts with Indian tribes as long as such gaming is lawful in the state in any
respect,3" IGRA simultaneously denied any incentive for states to negotiate: it
refused to authorize states to tax such gaming. 3 From the perspective of state
officials, the act of negotiating, even under legal compulsion, may appear to
voters like cooperation or capitulation. Such negotiations might therefore be
politically untenable to state elected officials. To address the lack of a positive
incentive and the possible existence of a political disincentive, Congress created an elaborate scheme in which a tribe could ultimately sue a state for refusing to negotiate in good faith toward a compact.3 2 However, eight years after
IGRA's enactment, the Supreme Court found this tribal remedy to be unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
Thus, although the compact requirement placed what was effectively a
veto power in the hands of state governments to stop Indian gaming,34 tribes
now lack any mechanism for testing the legitimacy of any such "veto." As a
result, following Seminole Tribe, it is not clear whether the compact requirement continues to exist; thus states may no longer have an effective veto.35 As
for Class II gaming, because of tribal sovereign immunity and other obstacles,
28 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (2000) with 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2000).
29

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(B)-(C) (2000).

30 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2000) ("[Tlhe State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in

good faith to enter into such a compact.").
31 Id. § 2710(d)(4).
32 Id. § 2710(d)(3)-(7).
33 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
3' As noted by numerous commentators, the compact requirement has never been very
effective. See, e.g., Gatsby Contreras, Exclusivity Agreements in Tribal-State Compacts:
Mutual Benefit Revenue-Sharing or Illegal State Taxation?, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 487
(2002); Gary W. Donohue, The Eleventh Amendment: The Supreme Court's Frustrating
Impediment to Sensible Regulation of Indian Gaming, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 295 (1999); Joe
Laxague, Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations: Who Should Decide the Issue of
Bad Faith?, 25 J. LEGIS. 77 (1999); Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the
Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47 (2002); Wolf, supra
note 8.
35 At least one federal court has refused to allow an action to proceed against a tribe for
gaming without a compact where a state was refusing to negotiate. The court would have
allowed the action if the government had successfully established that the state's refusal was
justified by state law making the gaming illegal. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians,
139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:285

states have no real ability to enforce their "veto" if tribes conduct gaming without state consent.36
To some degree, then, the cross-border problem of Indian gaming is not
fully resolved, leaving Indian gaming in a gray area of the law. If, from the
state perspective, Indian gaming is viewed as a cross-border problem in which
states seek to extend their laws across the borders of Indian reservations,
Cabazon is evidence that states initially failed in that endeavor. However,
states have succeeded to a much greater extent, at least in the area of casinostyle gaming, after Congress intervened. IGRA extends state law across reservation borders (even in states without Public Law 280 authority on Indian reservations). Because of the uncertainty of the compact requirement after
Seminole, Indian gaming has continued to present cross-border problems that
are difficult to address in a legal forum. Thus, Indian gaming issues sometimes
seem similar to international cross-border issues that are also fraught with practical problems such as enforcement and forum selection.
The legal ambiguities that continue to exist are problematic not only for
states, but have also harmed some tribes that sought and failed to obtain financing for new gaming operations. 37 Reputable financial institutions are understandably disinclined to lend financial support to ventures of uncertain legality.
As a result, despite continuing uncertainty as to whether a compact is required,
tribes have sought compacts and most states have obliged.38 Tribes have used
financial resources, political clout, or both, to obtain cooperation from state
governments. In other words, tribal and state governments have bargained
around the legal uncertainties.
To sum up, the cross-border issue that lies at the heart of Indian gaming that is, the question as to the applicability and enforcement of state law - is not
a simple matter. It remains clouded by the uncertainties surrounding Class III
gaming compact requirements and issues as to the scope of Class I1 machine
gaming. Nevertheless, the seemingly simple question of "What makes Indian
gaming lawful?" has two clear principles. First, some form of Indian gaming is
lawful if state law allows at least some forms of gaming. Second, Indian gaming is entirely unlawful where state law strictly prohibits all gambling. Thus,
one simple answer to the question of what makes Indian gaming lawful is "state
law." To a great extent, even when gaming is sanctioned by the federal common law of Indian nations39 and confirmed in statutory law,40 a state can prohibit Indian gaming of either the Class II or the Class III variety by simply
36 Generally, states must ask the United States (acting through its law enforcement arm, the

United States Department of Justice or the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)) to
take action to shut down Indian casinos that operate without a gaming compact. Since the
United States has its own independent political interests, resource allocation priorities, and
legal responsibilities, it may not always be willing to assist the states in shutting down Indian
casinos.
37 Cf. Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of
Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REv. 47, 74 & n. 205 (2002). See also Kevin K. Washburn,
Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, I Wyo. L. REV. 427, 429-30 (2001) (noting that

tribal-state gaming compacts had been entered in 24 states).
38 Washburn, supra note 37.
39 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
40 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2000).
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prohibiting all gaming within the state.4 ' In other words, the legality of Indian
gaming in every state is at the mercy of individual state governments.
Though stark, these observations are not particularly earth shattering. A
casual look at Cabazon, IGRA, and relevant case law illustrates that, on the one
hand, the lawfulness of Indian gaming lies ultimately in the hands of states and,
on the other, it is subject to a great deal of continuing uncertainty. Accordingly, this discussion will now move to an observation that is not as apparent
from the face of the federal statutes and case law and that presents slightly
more nuance.
II.

Q:

WHAT MAKES INDIAN GAMING SUCCESSFUL? A: STATE LAW

Even given the complex, idiosyncratic, and dysfunctional legal regime
underlying Indian gaming, the question of what makes a particular business
legal is not nearly as interesting or important as the question as to what makes
such a business profitable. It is to that question that this discussion now turns.
Because of the first three rules of real estate,42 Indian tribes enter most
consumer-oriented enterprises with a distinct disadvantage related to geography
and demographics. Indian tribal businesses generally are located on Indian reservations, most of which are remote from large urban populations. To be successful in a normal competitive business environment, then, an Indian tribe
must usually overcome a distinct competitive handicap: its remote location. It
is for this reason that the average consumer-oriented business on an Indian
reservation suffers from a competitive disadvantage when compared to nonIndian businesses that offer similar or identical products.
Under federal law , Indian casinos may be located only on Indian lands. 43
The key to a successful Indian gaming operation, in the words of the Supreme
Court, are the "patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make
purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time there enjoying ...
comfortable, clean and attractive facilities and well-run games.""
A commercial, non-Indian casino entrepreneur who established a lawful
casino in a more advantageous location might quickly obtain a competitive
advantage over even those Indian casinos that are relatively close to major metropolitan areas. Only a handful of tribes possess advantageous business locations.45 If (or when) states adopt more permissive attitudes toward gaming and
41

United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).

42 The first three rules of real estate, the common phrase asserts, are "Location, location,

location."
43 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(4), 2710(b)(1). If an Indian tribe wishes to open a gaming operation
elsewhere, it may do so only to the extent that gaming is authorized by state law. One
Michigan tribe, for example, is involved in commercial gaming with a ninety percent ownership interest in the Greektown Casino in Detroit, Michigan. Such gaming is not "Indian
gaming" as the term is defined by federal law. During the past two centuries, tribes have
generally been reluctant to subject themselves to state jurisdiction and have thus tended to
shy away from businesses outside of Indian lands.
I Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 219.
41 Of more than 300 Indian gaming operations in the nations, a few Indian casinos have
excellent locations in metropolitan areas such as Albuquerque, Milwaukee, Palms Springs,
or Phoenix, but these are the exceptions. Most are located at least forty-five minutes from a
major metropolitan area, and often further.
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allow non-Indian commercial casinos to compete directly with Indian casinos,
tribal casinos will suffer. Indeed, what is now an opportunity - the right to
conduct gaming on Indian lands - will become the limitation that Indian gaming can occur only on Indian lands. In most places, a market entrant without
the Indian land limitation may well be able to obtain a far more advantageous
business location for a casino.
What, then, makes Indian gaming profitable? Or, to ask the question in a
more provocative manner, what has enabled aggregate Indian gaming revenues
to exceed, by a large margin, the gaming revenues from the Atlantic City and
Las Vegas markets combined?4 6 The answer is, once again, state law. In particular, restrictive state gaming laws that prevent competition with Indian tribes
have made Indian gaming profitable.4 7 Thus, the tribal casinos' success can be
attributed primarily to the failure of states to adopt a broader permissive attitude toward gaming.

As noted above, many states restrict gaming substantially. Indeed, in
many states, gaming may be available only to charitable groups, such as
churches and fraternal groups and may be highly restricted as to time, place and
manner, such as stakes. Despite these restrictions, tribes can compact for Class
III casino style gaming and can offer whatever gaming the compact authorizes.
In virtually every state with successful Indian casinos, state laws prohibit commercial gaming or restrict it to distinct forms, such as dog or horse racing, that
do not compete directly with Indian gaming.4 8 Indian casinos in those states
can be characterized, as noted above, as islands of gaming permissiveness in an
ocean of gaming intolerance. In those circumstances, Indian casinos are attractive to gaming patrons because they are the only option. In contrast, in those
states in which casinos operated by non-Indians are lawful and regulated, tribes
are generally not successful participants in the market.4 9
Recent estimates place Las Vegas gaming revenues at $5 to $7 billion and Atlantic City
revenues at slightly more than $4 billion. The most recent statistics from the NIGC suggest
that the Indian gaming industry produced $14.5 billion in gaming revenues in the most
recently completed audit period, which included any tribal fiscal years ending in 2002. See
Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n website at http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/tribes/revenue.jsp (last
visited Jan. 19, 2004).
" Henry J. Lischer, Jr., United States Taxation of Native American Indian Gambling Activities: The Huntfor the Modem Buffalo?, 65 GEBURSTAG 701, 707 (Ulrich Hibner & Werner
F. Ebke eds., 1999) (Festschrift fur Professor Bernhard Grossfeld zum) (recognizing that the
commercial non-Indian casinos in the United States generally face more competitive markets
than Indian casinos) (on file with author).
48 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 225.00, 225.30 (McKinney 2003) (creating offenses for
gambling and possession of gambling devices); N.Y. RAc. PARI-MUT. WAG. & BREED. LAW
§ 202 (McKinney 2003) (authorizing horse racing wagering); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1607
(McKinney 2003) (addressing state lottery).
" Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, and New Jersey are examples. Exceptions are
Michigan and Mississippi, but in those states Indian gaming generally long predated the
commercial casinos and operates in different geographical markets within the states. In
Michigan, the state law authorizing commercial gaming protects the tribes' out of state markets with provisions that limit commercial casino gaming to cities with populations over
800,000 that are located within 100 miles of another state or country that permits gaming.
The practical effect of these provisions is to limit commercial gaming to the City of Detroit,
thus allowing competition with the casinos across the international border in Windsor,
Canada, but limiting direct competition with the Indian casinos throughout the rest of the
46
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In economic terms, restrictive state gaming laws create barriers to entry

that provide Indian tribes with an artificial monopolistic market, or in those
markets in which several tribes compete, an artificial oligopolistic market in

which the only other competitors offering casino gaming are other tribes. State
laws have the effect of limiting or preventing competition for casino gaming
patrons and protecting strong profit margins for tribal governments.5 0 Indeed,
economic theory would likely conclude that the artificial barriers created by

state laws actually harm gaming patrons who might obtain gambling at a lower
price5" or with greater choice in a market with greater competition.
Why have states maintained these artificial barriers to entry? The answer,
of course, is not legal in nature, but rather political or, perhaps, drawn from

public choice theory. One suspects that state policymakers are not acting solely
out of an idealistic desire to try to protect the tribal casinos that have provided
substantial resources to an underprivileged constituency group. Rather, they

likely are exhibiting simple political calculation. Public choice theorists could
make a far better argument than what follows, but it is likely that the increasingly politically powerful Indian tribal governments are lobbying aggressively
and that tribal members and even non-Indian casino employees are voting.
Together they have succeeded in inducing some state legislators to act in the

interests of these tribal constituents.5" In many states, such legislators join
forces with other legislators who represent constituents who are simply
opposed to gambling expansion. Although limiting gaming to Indian lands
makes no more sense as a matter of public policy than limiting gaming to
riverboats, gaming opponents often seek limits on any possible basis. Thus, the
barriers to entry are preserved by an alliance of unlikely bedfellows in the state
political process.
state. In Mississippi, most of the gaming is along the coast in Biloxi. When the coastal
gaming market developed, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians already had a welldeveloped operation located more than 120 miles north of the coast and much closer to the
principal population centers in central Mississippi, including Jackson and Meridian. Having
said that, the Mississippi Choctaw seem to have been successful in maintaining a strong
gaming operation despite substantial competition.
50 In most of these states, the existence of a monopoly depends to some degree on the scope
of the market industry. Customers seeking gaming entertainment have, of course, a wide
variety of activities available to them, including, depending on the state, lotteries, horse and
dog racing, and even internet gaming. For the customer interested in casino gaming, however, laws in most states have strongly constricted consumer choices. States have made most
forms of competition to Indian casinos unlawful and thus the success of Indian gaming is
due to the protection of their markets through state laws preventing competition. The extent
of the monopoly is determined economically by comparing the elasticity of demand relative
to the other gambling activities. Relatively inelastic demand as to price between, for example, lotteries and casino gambling means that the casino industry's monopolistic power is
stronger.
11 In practical terms, "lower price". in the gaming context actually means greater payout or
less retention, or in the true jargon of the industry, "looser slots."
52 See John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participationin
American Politics:A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533 (2001), and
DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM,
(Paula D. McClain et al. eds., 2002) for insightful discussions of tribal political power in
state and federal elections.
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The tremendous tribal political activity in the state political process demonstrates that, while the legality of Indian gaming may present cross-border
issues, the profitability of tribal casinos is not a cross-border problem at all.
Indeed, state political activity by Indian tribes demonstrates that this aspect of
Indian gaming is the very antithesis of a cross-border problem. Rather, it is an
example of state law being used to protect an important constituency within the
state: Indian tribes and their gaming operations.
III.

INDIAN GAMING, FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY, AND
CROSS-BORDER ISSUES

In light of the cross-border problem giving rise to Indian gaming and the
preservation of restrictive state laws that have protected Indian casinos, what
lessons can Indian gaming offer those interested in cross-border issues? This
Article has sought, in Parts I and II, to describe the legal structure and economic success of Indian gaming in light of the state government, a competing
sovereign. As observed above, the question of the legality of Indian gaming
that initially pitted states and tribes against one another is, in many respects, a
cross-border issue possessing continuing uncertainty.
The question of Indian casinos' profitability, on the other hand, has not
unfolded as a cross-border issue at all, but rather has become an internal state
political issue of enormous importance to tribes. In protecting their markets,
tribes have behaved not as separate sovereigns, but as active participants in
state-level politics.5 3 One way of describing the outcome is that Indian tribes
have taken advantage of the lack of clarity posed by the cross-border issues to
build economic resources and then used these economic resources to convert
the cross-border issue to an internal political issue. This account of Indian
gaming leads to particular observations about both Indian law and policy and
cross-border issues.
A.

Indian Gaming and the Rise of State Power in Indian Policy

The transformation of Indian gaming from a cross-border issue to an internal state political issue is a development of enormous consequence for Indian
law and policy. For two centuries, Indian tribes had a nearly exclusive relationship with the United States and no relationship with state governments. This
relationship began even before the United States came into existence 5' and
became part of the federalist structure of our government. Indian tribes
11 Indian tribes present a unique circumstance for cross-border analysis. On one hand, they
are independent sovereigns with limited powers of self-government and geographical boundaries. On the other hand, they are wholly located within the borders of states, and states
posses jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian reservations. This sets up numerous potential
cross-border issues. Additionally, tribal governments operate businesses and are employers
of state citizens and are composed of tribal members who are citizens of state governments.
Indeed, tribal members are citizens of both the tribe and the state in which they live; they are
also entitled to vote in those states. See, e.g., Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948);
Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387 (N.M. 1962).
4 During the colonial period, tribes had relationships with the British monarch that largely
pre-empted any relationship with the colonies. The United States adopted a similar
approach, taking Indian affairs as one of the federal powers and pre-empting the states. See
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counted on the federal government to protect them from the rapacious settlers
that sought to overrun Indian lands, as well as the state governments that sanctioned such activity.5
Tribes rarely consulted with state governments or
engaged them on a government-to-government basis. Through Public Law 280
and other laws, Congress changed this exclusive federal relationship, or even
terminated the relationship, but such policies were quickly rejected and widely
criticized.56
But where the federal government once refereed cross-border issues
between states and tribes with little direct dialogue between the groups, the
states and the tribes are now carrying on active dialogue directly with one
another and, for the most part, are bypassing the federal government. Even
where one side or the other has sought federal intervention in Indian gaming
issues, the federal intervention has worked primarily as a catalyst for statetribal negotiations.
One of the most vivid examples was the compacting process in Arizona.
In 1992, a team of FBI agents and U.S. Marshals were deployed to seize gaming devices at an Indian casino run by the Fort McDowell Apache Tribe in
Arizona." The tribe refused to surrender the gaming devices and actively
obstructed the federal agents. During the ensuing standoff, the Governor of
Arizona flew in by helicopter, met with the tribes, requested a "cooling off'
period and, ultimately, reached gaming compacts with the tribe.5 8
A similar situation arose in California, when then-Governor Pete Wilson
of California refused to negotiate with Indian tribes in the 1990s and the tribes
continued gaming without compacts, threats and the filing of a complaint for
forfeiture of gaming machines filed by the United States Department of Justice
motivated the tribes to seek a compact that would resolve the dispute.
In both Arizona and California, tribes deftly outmaneuvered state governmental leadership by working at the grassroots level. These tribes successfully
convinced state citizens to support Indian gaming directly by approving statewide voter initiatives.5 9 In several states, tribal governments then succeeded in
making Indian gaming indispensable to state governments through "revenue
Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamationof 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329 (1989).
" See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973).
56

See generally

CAROL GOLDBERG-AMBROSE,

PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS:

TRIBAL SUR-

VIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (McHaughton & Gunn, Inc. 1997).
17 Glenn M. Feldman, The Great Casino Controversy - Indian Gaming in Arizona,

29

ARIZ.

AT'y 19 (July 1993).
58 Id. at 19.
59 In Arizona, this crafty political decision by the tribe resulted in great embarrassment to

the state's governor when the governor later balked at signing the compacts. In the ensuing
litigation, the state supreme court held that because "both the legislators and governor are
elected to serve the will of the people," the will of the people, when made apparent through
the initiative process, trumps the authority of the governor or the legislature. Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Hull, 945 P.2d 818, 825 (Ariz. 1997). The court ordered the
governor to sign gaming compacts. With the tribes having beaten the governor at the ballot
box and in the courts, the governor finally complied. See id. For a discussion of the voter
initiatives on Indian gaming in California, see In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d
1094 (9th Cir. 2003).
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sharing" agreements that provide substantial funding to state governments and
give state appropriators a vested interest in continued Indian gaming.6 °
The result of this activity, prompted by IGRA, has been a paradigm shift
in Indian policy in the United States. In light of aggressive state political activities, the federal-tribal relationship has given way to a state-tribal relationship
that has had far greater economic importance to Indian tribes. The magnitude
of tribal gaming revenues has dwarfed the appropriations that tribes receive
from the federal government. 6 1 And the gaming compacts that tribes have
entered with states might, in any other context, be called treaties.62
Thus, Indian gaming has transformed the nature of Indian policy in the
United States from an exclusively federal issue to an important issue of state
politics. From the tribal government perspective, the good news is that tribes
have proven very effective at the state level. Tribal organization and financial
resources have made them powerful forces within state politics. On the other
hand, tribal governments are subject to state politics to a far greater extent than
in the past. Jettisoning the federal-tribal relationship in favor of tribal-state

relationships may not be troubling to tribal governments during a period in
which many tribal governments are prosperous and can use their financial
resources to exercise powerful political muscle with state policy makers. This
shift may become less attractive when the success of Indian gaming begins to

wane.
From an economic standpoint, Indian gaming will wane. Although economic theory posits that natural monopolies are durable, artificial monopolies
such as those created by legal barriers to entry tend not to endure. Economists
might thus predict that Indian gaming has a limited future.
For many tribes, Indian gaming is the most significant economic resource
available. Indeed, in light of its success, it is arguably the single most effective
economic development mechanism that Indian country has ever known.6 3 The
60 Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State Revenue

Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451, 452 (2003).
61 Though it is sometimes difficult to make an accurate estimate of federal appropriations
for Indian tribes because of difficulties in determining which numbers to include, it is probably fair to assert that federal Indian appropriations are in the neighborhood of five billion
dollars. See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations,
House Approves FY04 Interior Appropriations Bill (July 17, 2003) (listing $2.9 billion for
Indian Health Service, $566 million for Indian Education, and $1.9 billion for Indian programs) (on file with author). Indian gaming revenues seem to be approaching three times
that figure. See supra note 46.
62 Under federal law, a federal official has an opportunity to review and approve or disapprove tribal-state gaming compacts. 25 U.S.C. § 710(d)(8)(C) (2000). Because a compact is
deemed approved if the Secretary fails to take action within 45 days, such review is essentially optional. The Secretary has rarely disapproved such compacts, and if the state and a
tribe are satisfied, it is hard to understand what federal interest would justify disapproval.
63 Ray Halbritter, leader of the Oneida Tribe in New York, once famously defended Indian
gaming against internal tribal opposition, declaring, "We had tried poverty for 200 years, so
we decided to try something else." Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or
Dependence? The PracticalValue and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 531, 568 (1994). Halbritter detailed tremendous opportunities that gaming resources have given his tribe, including reacquiring:
more than 2,600 acres of our ancient land for our people ...We feed our elders and are able now
to conduct our ceremonies on a regular basis. The first building we built with our profits as a

Winter 2003/2004] FEDERAL LAW, STATE POLICY, & INDIAN GAMING

299

fact that it exists solely at the mercy of states sends chills down the spines of
many traditional Indian lawyers who are accustomed to litigating against states.
B.

Lessons from Indian Gaming for Cross-Border Issues

Although Indian tribes are, in some respects, sui generis, Indian gaming is
a business, and business has had a long and complicated relationship with law
and politics. The history of Indian gaming may thus have some relevance
beyond the borders of Indian reservations. Indian gaming appears to offer a
handful of lessons for other cross-border issues.
First, the transformation of key issues in Indian gaming from cross-border
issues to internal state political issues highlights the fact that solutions to crossborder issues will sometimes lie within the political processes of one of the
interested jurisdictions. Where the cross-border problem creates economic
opportunities and powerful economic forces, the likelihood of a political solution is tremendous.
In the Indian gaming context, substantial financial capital flowed "across
the border" toward Indian tribal casinos while the cross-border issue - the
legality of Indian gaming - remained unresolved. In building hundred million
dollar casinos and hiring thousands of employees in California, for example,
the California tribes created powerful vested interests in successful Indian casinos and developed substantial financial resources. Much of this growth
occurred while the legality of Indian gaming was clouded by the lack of gaming compacts authorizing the activity. Despite the ambiguity, this tremendous
human and financial capital empowered the tribes to operate successful Indian
gaming operations and to develop substantial political power.
However, the lack of clarity caused by the existence of "cross-border"
issues presented obstacles to greater growth and thus created clear financial
incentives to resolve the legal ambiguities. Business abhors uncertainty. Lenders generally will not provide financing on favorable terms for investments that
are legally uncertain and therefore risky. For tribes, obtaining access to capital
at fair rates required resolution of an issue that otherwise might have continued
to remain unresolved indefinitely. While tribes could successfully exploit the
lack of clarity to initiate ganing, to be truly successful they needed certainty.
Accordingly, they used financial resources to provide political pressure to
obtain gaming compacts and, afterward, to maintain restrictive state laws that
preserved insurmountable barriers to entry by any potential competitors.
Although cross-border issues exist in a variety of contexts, gaming is an
industry with tremendous financial opportunities. To apply the lessons of
Indian gaming in another gaming context, one might consider another signifination was a council house, which is our spiritual and governmental meeting place. We have
since then built a cook house, a health services center, a cultural center and museum, a recreational center, a swimming pool, a bath house, a children's playground, a gymnasium, and a
lacrosse box. Using our own money we also have established scholarship programs, medical,
dental, and optical services, job training and legal assistance programs, Oneida language and
song classes, mental health and substance abuse programs, elder meals programs, and other beneficial services for our people. We have established a police force, paved our roads, built a septic
system, consecrated a burial ground, opened a youth center, and built housing for our people....

Id. at 568-69.
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cant cross-border issue: the question of internet gaming. While the legality of
internet gaming presents different issues and challenges, some similarities are
apparent. Each moment that internet gaming activity successfully continues
provides both revenue and popular support that might provide resources that
market participants may use to pursue political solutions. Internet gaming vendors lack the political organization of tribal governments, the political appeal of
Indian gaming for a disadvantaged community, and the physical presence and
substantial employee base within the target jurisdiction. They do, however,
presumably have numerous consumers in virtually every jurisdiction. And the
financial capital that flows toward lucrative opportunities may well assist
internet entrepreneurs in finding political solutions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Indian gaming has continued to pose significant unresolved cross-border
issues. When it enacted IGRA, Congress resolved some of the cross-border
issues yet created others. In creating the compact requirement for Class III
Indian gaming, Congress largely replaced the exclusive federal relationship
with tribes in favor of a relationship between tribes and states. Congress also,
perhaps inadvertently, helped tribes transform Indian gaming from a festering
cross-border issue into an active state political issue. While tribes have regularly been defeated in the courts in recent years, 6 4 they have been very successful in state level politics. In obtaining compacts, and in seeking to preserve
their market advantages through restrictive state gambling laws, tribes have
succeeded in becoming effective participants in state politics. Indian gaming
has thus been transformed from a cross-border issue to a state policy or political issue.

6 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001).

